国企高管薪酬管制政策的有效性分析——基于政府公平偏好与企业绩效的双重视角

Effectiveness Analysis of Regulation on Senior Executive's Remuneration in State-owned Enterprises Based on Perspectives from Both Government's Preference for Equity and State-owned Enterprises' Performance

中文关键词:  国有企业  薪酬管制  政府效用  公平偏好  企业绩效  收入分配改革

英文关键词:state-owned enterprises (SOEs)  regulation of senior executives' remuneration  government utility  preference for fairness  enterprise performance  income distribution reform

中文摘要:

      国企高管薪酬管制政策已逐渐在全国推行。现有文献对薪酬管制政策效果的评价存在一定的争论,且使用理论模型进行研究的较少,更少有文献将公平与绩效置于同一框架下进行分析。在建立的理论模型中,政府效用源于国企营利、公共服务、薪酬分配的公平性,高管效用源于两种努力及政府的两种激励。模型显示,限制国企高管薪酬将缩小高管与公众、高管与普通员工的薪酬差距,并降低企业效率。薪酬差距的缩小将提高政府效用,而企业效率的下滑将降低政府效用。在理论建模的基础上,选取2008—2016年国有上市公司数据,使用双重差分模型对国企高管限薪的效果进行验证,发现薪酬管制政策显著降低了两类收入差距及企业绩效。进一步分析表明,国企高管的绝对薪酬与企业绩效正相关,相对薪酬与企业绩效负相关。理论模型与实证结果意味着政府目标与企业目标存在不一致性。解决政府效用与企业绩效的矛盾,成为国企薪酬政策面临的重要问题。研究结论对国有企业的收入分配制度改革具有参考意义。

英文摘要:

      At present, most regions in China have implemented the regulation of senior executive's remuneration in the state-owned enterprises. There are different opinions about this policy's effectiveness in current literatures, while the theoretical analysis are few. None of those literatures have considered the effectiveness from the perspective of both equity and performance. In our theoretical model, the utility of government stems from the state-owned enterprises' profits, public services, and fairness of distribution. While senior executives' utility stems from two kinds of efforts and two kinds of government incentives. This model suggests that limiting executives' pay in the state-owned enterprises would reduce the distribution gap between senior executives and the public, as well as between executives and ordinary employees, and reduce corporate efficiency. The shrink of distribution gap will increase government's utility, while the decline of corporates' efficiency will reduce government's utility. Based on the theoretical model, DID method is used to verify the policy's effect according to the data during the years from 2008 to 2016. We find that the pay control policy has significantly reduced the distribution gap and corporate performance. Further analysis shows that the absolute compensation of executives is positively related to corporates' performance, while the relative remuneration is negatively related to corporates' performance. Theoretical model and empirical test show that there is inconsistency between government's goals and corporates' goals. How to solve the contradiction between government utility and corporate performance has become a major problem that the state-owned enterprises must face. This study is of great significance to the reform of the income distribution in the state-owned enterprises.