盈余管理、职业压力与财务总监离职——以操控性应计为例的实证检验

Earnings Management, Occupational Stress and CFO Leaving: Empirical Evidence Based on DA Test

中文关键词:  财务总监  操控性应计  离职倾向  财务总监持股  国有企业  审计意见

英文关键词:chief financial officer (CFO)  discretionary accrual (DA)  leaving intention  CFO shareholding  state-owned enterprise (SOE)  audit opinion

中文摘要:

      在上市公司的盈余管理中,财务总监既是决策层面的重要参与者又是执行层面的主要负责人。鉴于财务总监需要对财务报告质量负责,上市公司的盈余管理行为极有可能给其带来职业压力,进而导致其离职。根据2007—2014年中国A股市场数据,实证检验发现:在一般情况下,上市公司的应计盈余管理水平越高,财务总监离职概率越大；财务总监持股和国有控股的企业性质,均能在一定程度上缓解盈余管理对财务总监离职的影响；外部审计师的审计意见在盈余管理和财务总监离职之间起到了部分中介作用。研究结论对资本市场的监管者、投资者以及上市公司等都具有一定的借鉴与启示。监管者和投资者应加强对上市公司财务总监离职信息披露的监督和关注；上市公司应进一步完善公司治理和健全内部控制,增强财务总监在财务报告上的独立性和话语权。

英文摘要:

      In the earnings management of listed companies, the chief financial officer (CFO) is not only an important participant in the decision-making level, but also the main role in charge of the implementation level. In view of the fact that the CFO is responsible for the quality of financial report, it is possible that earnings management is quite likely to bring occupational stress to the CFO and lead to his/her leaving. Based on the China's A-stock market data during the years from 2007 to 2014, the empirical test finds that:in general, the higher the level of accrued earnings management, the greater the probability of CFO's resignation; both CFO shareholding and the state-owned enterprises (SOE) nature will alleviate the impact of earnings management on CFO leaving; the audit opinions from external auditor partly play a role of mediator between earnings management and CFO leaving. The findings and conclusions in this paper are of some reference and inspiration to regulators, investors, listed companies and so on. Regulators and investors should strengthen the supervision and concern to information disclosure of CFO leaving in listed companies. At the same time, the listed companies should improve the corporation governance and internal control, strengthen CFO's independence and discourse power in financial reports. 