中国家族上市公司代际绩效差异的影响机制研究

Influence Mechanism of Generational Performance Difference in China's Family-owned Listed Firms

中文关键词:  家族企业  代际传承  家族CEO  家族控制  企业绩效

英文关键词:family firms  inter-generational succession  family CEO  family control  firm performance

中文摘要:

      中国家族企业的传承实践显示,二代接班之后的企业绩效参差不齐。而理论成果普遍认为,与继任者相比,创始人CEO在位期间的绩效更优。现有研究不足以解释中国家族企业的传承实践,而且从理论层面探索家族企业代际绩效差异原因的研究也相对匮乏。由此,基于中国家族上市公司,从公司治理特征以及战略偏好的角度比较家族企业创始人CEO和继任CEO经营绩效的差异,探索家族企业代际绩效差异的黑箱。研究表明,创始人CEO在位期间的绩效要优于继任CEO,与创始人CEO相比,家族继任CEO经营管理下的家族企业更注重对家族控制的强化,也更偏好保守型的战略政策,从而对企业绩效有着消极影响。因此,家族继任者接班要避免过度强化家族控制,有意识地通过系列治理措施降低第二类代理问题加剧的可能性,同时把控好企业的战略偏好尺度。

英文摘要:

      According to the succession practice of family-owned firms in China, the firm performance is uneven among the second generations in different companies. Theoretical studies generally hold the view that compared with the successor, the founder CEO leads to a better performance. However, the research available has a lack of explanation to succession practice of family-owned firms in China. Moreover, few researches theoretically explore the reasons why generational performance varies among the family-owned firms. Therefore, based on the family-owned listed firms in China, this paper tries to compare the inter-generational performance difference between founder and successor from the perspective of corporate governance and strategic preference. It has found that the performance of the founder CEO is superior to that of the successor. Compared with the founder CEO, family successor pays more attention to strengthening family control, and also prefers to conservative strategic policy, which has a negative impact on firm performance. Therefore, successors should avoid strengthening family control excessively and take a series of measures to solve the agency problem of large and minority shareholders. At the same time, successors should also limit their strategic preference.