股权结构、产权性质与高管薪酬粘性——基于我国A股上市公司的实证研究

Ownership Structure, Property Right Nature and Executive Compensation Stickiness: Empirical Study Based on A-share Listed Companies in China

中文关键词:  股权结构  产权性质  企业业绩  高管薪酬粘性  委托代理问题  公司治理

英文关键词:ownership structure  property right nature  corporate performance  executive compensation stickiness  agency problem  corporate governance

中文摘要:

      近年来,我国上市公司高管薪酬尤其是国有企业高管薪酬成为政府监管的重点和社会舆论关注的焦点问题。文章以2010—2014年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了上市公司高管薪酬粘性的存在性；同时,重点考察了股权结构、产权性质对上市公司高管薪酬粘性的影响程度。实证结果显示:我国上市公司高管薪酬具有显著的粘性特征；在股权结构的影响方面,第一大股东持股比例越高,股权制衡度越低,高管薪酬粘性相应越高,当控股股东与中小股东之间产生利益冲突时,上市公司高管作为控股股东利益的代表,通常忽视上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩的不对称性,因此薪酬粘性成为控股股东对高管的奖励；在产权性质的影响方面,国有企业高管薪酬粘性显著大于非国有企业。研究结论对于提高我国上市公司的治理效率、降低代理成本、优化激励机制设计具有一定的启示。

英文摘要:

      In recent years, the executive compensation in China's listed companies, especially in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), has been an emphasis for government regulation and a focus with social concern. Based on the research object of the A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China during the years from 2010 to 2014, this paper empirically verifies the existence of executive compensation stickiness in the listed companies. At the same time, it emphasizes the study on how ownership structure and property right nature affect the executive compensation stickiness in the listed companies. The result shows that the executive compensation in China's listed companies has the obvious characteristics of stickiness. As to the influence of ownership structure, the higher the proportion of the largest shareholder is, the lower the equity balance degree, and the higher the executive compensation stickiness. When the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders have a conflict of interest, executives usually represent the interests of the controlling shareholder and often neglect the asymmetry between executive compensation and corporate performance, and hence the compensation stickiness becomes an award to executives by controlling shareholder. As to the influence of property right nature, the executive compensation stickiness is obviously greater in the SOEs than in the non-state enterprises. The research conclusions are enlightening in improving the governance efficiency in China's listed companies, reducing the agency cost, and optimizing the incentives mechanism. 