分类治理视角下国有企业高管薪酬激励机制研究

Research on Compensation Incentives for Senior Executives in SOEs under Governance Classification Perspective

中文关键词:  国有企业  分类治理  高管薪酬  薪酬激励  公益类  商业类

英文关键词:state-owned enterprises (SOEs)  governance classification  senior executive compensation  compensation incentives  public-welfare category  competitive category

中文摘要:

      国有企业分类治理是现阶段国企改革的关键举措之一。文章以“国有企业分类治理”为研究视角,基于2010—2014年244家国有上市公司相关数据,检验了国有企业中高管薪酬激励的有效性,进而提出国有企业高管薪酬激励机制的设计思路。研究结果显示:总体而言,高管薪酬与国有企业绩效显著正相关,但该结果在公益类国企样本中得不到支持,而在商业类国企中结果显著。除此之外,在不同类型国企中,国有股比例、独立董事比例等因素对企业绩效的影响也存在显著差异。因此,国有企业分类治理存在现实合理性,研究结论为我国国有企业公司治理改革提供了理论支持和决策依据。

英文摘要:

      The governance classification of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is the key to the reform of SOEs at present. With the governance classification of SOEs as the research perspective, based on the data of 244 listed SOEs during the period from 2010 to 2014, this paper verifies the effectiveness of compensation incentives in the SOEs and further presents the compensation incentives mechanism for senior executives in the SOEs. The result shows that senior executives' compensation generally has a significantly positive correlation with corporate performance, which however fails to be supported in public-welfare SOEs while it shows a significant obvious result in the competitive SOEs. Besides, among different categories of SOEs, the factors such as the ratio of the state-owned shares, the ratio of independent directors, etc. also have obvious different impacts on corporate performances. Therefore, it is realistic and reasonable for governance classification of SOEs. The research conclusions can provide the theoretical support and decision-making basis for the governance classification of the SOEs in China. 