谢志华.国有资产授权经营体系:理论和框架[J].北京工商大学社科版,2016,31(4):4-13
国有资产授权经营体系:理论和框架
Theory and Framework on Authorized Operation System for State-owned Assets
投稿时间:2016-06-06  
DOI:
中文关键词:  国有资产  授权经营体系  授权监管体系  所有者监管  出资者监管
英文关键词:state-owned assets  authorized operation system  authorized regulatory system  ownership regulation  stakeholder regulation
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重点项目“国有资本授权关系及实现模式研究”(14AJY005);国家社会科学基金重大项目“国家治理视角下国有资本经营预算制度研究”(14ZDA027);北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心项目(GZ20130801)。
作者单位
谢志华 北京工商大学 国有资产管理协同创新中心, 北京 100048 
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中文摘要:
      国有资产经营必须实行两权分离,按照历史的发展轨迹,在两权分离的变迁过程中产生了两权五层次分离,相应形成了经营者系列和出资者系列。经营者系列包括资本经营者、资产经营者和部分资产经营者;出资者系列则由终极出资者和中间出资者组成,终极出资者就是国家,同时也是国有资产的所有者。每个层次的经营者都接受出资者的授权进行经营,而每个层次的出资者对经营者进行监管,这种监管也是通过授权进行的,所有者授权出资者、上一层级的出资者授权下一层级的出资者进行监管。授权经营与授权监管是两权分离关系中的两个方面,授权经营必然要授权监管,否则两权分离的关系不可能发生。出资者的性质以及出资者投资方式的不同将对授权监管和授权经营的具体内容和方式产生影响。间接投资的情况下,经营者获得的授权较多,主要依靠外部监管;直接设立公司的情况下,经营者获得的授权较少,出资者直接监管程度较高;直接购买公司股权情况下,经营者获得的授权和出资者的监管介于前两者之间。对于国有资产的授权,政策性垄断型国企类似于直接设立公司情形,政策性混合型国企类似于直接购买公司股权情形,而商业性竞争型国企则类似于间接投资情形。
英文摘要:
      This paper elaborates that the operation of state-owned assets must adopt the separation of ownership and management, and five levels of the separation of ownership and management has come into being in the change process, which forms the manager series and stakeholder series. Manager series include capital manager, asset manager and partial asset manager. Stakeholder series compose of ultimate investor and middle investor, in which ultimate investor is the country and also the owner of state-owned assets at the same time. The managers at each level are all authorized by stakeholders to implement the operation. The stakeholders at each level regulate managers, the regulation of which is also authorized, i.e. the owners authorize the stakeholders and the upper stakeholder authorizes the lower stakeholder to carry out the regulation. Authorized operation and authorized regulation are the two aspects in the separation of ownership and management. Authorized operation requires authorized regulation, otherwise it is impossible for the separation of ownership and management. The difference in the nature of stakeholders and the way of stakeholders' investment will influence the specific contents and ways in authorized regulation and authorized operation. In the case of indirect investment, managers are more authorized, mainly by external regulation. In the case of directly establishing a company, managers are less authorized with a relatively high degree of direct regulation by stakeholders. In the case of directly purchasing company equity, managers are authorized and regulated by stakeholders to a degree just between the above-stated two cases. For the state-owned assets, managers are authorized in policy-based monopolistic state-owned enterprises (SOEs) similar to the case of directly establishing a company, in policy-based mixed SOEs similar to the case of directly purchasing the company equity, and in commercial competitive SOEs similar to the case of indirect investment. 
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