陈江华.国有企业构建学习型组织的内部博弈行为研究[J].北京工商大学社科版,2016,31(2):110-116, 126 |
国有企业构建学习型组织的内部博弈行为研究 |
Research on Internal Game Behaviors in State-owned Enterprises in Constructing Learning Organization |
投稿时间:2015-10-03 |
DOI: |
中文关键词: 国有企业 学习型组织 内部博弈 博弈策略 离散型博弈 连续型博弈 |
英文关键词:state-owned enterprise (SOE) learning organization internal game game strategies discrete game continuous game |
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中文摘要: |
从国有企业如何构建学习型组织的视角出发,通过构建离散型和连续型两种博弈行为模型,分析国有企业与员工之间的博弈行为。研究发现,连续型博弈行为的收益共享策略能解决离散型博弈行为收益共享策略所面临的“囚徒困境”。在古诺博弈和斯塔克尔伯格博弈两种外部环境下,分别将变动分配和固定分配作为收益共享原则,建立国有企业内部博弈模型,及时关注企业与员工之间博弈行为的互动并改变博弈策略,保障企业有效运行。最后,以同仁堂集团为实例,验证国有企业内部博弈行为模型的有效性。 |
英文摘要: |
From the perspective of state-owned enterprises' construction of learning organization, by constructing discrete or continuous game behavior model to analyze the game behaviors of state-owned enterprises between the enterprise and employees. The research finds that continuous game behavior of earnings sharing policy can provide solution to the prisoner's dilemma problem in the discrete game behavior of revenue sharing strategy. Under two external environments including Cournot Game and Stackelberg Game, this study separately sets floating distribution and fixed distribution as the revenue sharing principle to establish the internal game model in the state-owned enterprises. Prompt attention is paid to the interaction of game behaviors between enterprises and employees and the change of game strategy to ensure the effective operation of enterprise. Finally, this study takes Tongrentang Group as an example and testifies the feasibility of the proposed model of internal game behaviors within enterprises. |
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