薪酬委员会设立、产权性质与高管薪酬

Establishment of Remuneration Committee, Nature of Property Right and Executive Compensation

中文关键词:  薪酬委员会设立  薪酬业绩敏感度  产权性质  相对业绩

英文关键词:establishment of remuneration committee  compensation-performance sensitivity  nature of property right  relative performance

中文摘要:

      以自愿披露薪酬委员会的上市公司为研究样本,并以“最优契约论”和“经理人权力论”为理论基础,探讨了不同产权性质下薪酬委员会设立与高管薪酬的关系。实证研究发现:国有企业中设置薪酬委员会的上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感度更高,而非国有企业中则相反；进一步细分国有企业发现,央企中设置薪酬委员会的上市公司具有更高薪酬业绩敏感度,而地方国企则相反;通过对相对业绩和业绩变化的进一步考察发现,在相对业绩高和业绩上升时,地方国企设置薪酬委员会的上市公司其薪酬业绩敏感度更高；在相对业绩低和业绩下降时,央企设置薪酬委员会的上市公司薪酬业绩敏感度更高。这意味着薪酬委员会的设置在不同产权性质企业、央企和地方国企以及企业不同相对业绩和业绩变化的情况下,对高管薪酬业绩敏感度的作用不同,地方国企薪酬委员会的设置具有为其高管辩护的经验证据,更符合经理人权力理论。

英文摘要:

      Based on the listed companies with voluntarily established remuneration committee, with the “Optimal Contract Perspective” and the “Managers‘ Power Theory”, an empirical study is made in this paper and the findings are that:among the state-owned enterprises, the listed companies where the remuneration committees are established have higher executive compensation-performance sensitivity, while it is opposite among the non-state-owned enterprises; in case of a further subdivision of state-owned enterprises, among the state-owned enterprises controlled by central government, the listed companies with the setting of remuneration committee have higher executive compensation-performance sensitivity, while it is opposite among the local state-owned enterprises; with a further exploration into the relative performance and the change of performance, when the relative performance is high and the performance is on the increase, the executive compensation-performance sensitivity is higher in the listed companies with the setting of remuneration committee in the state-owned enterprises controlled by local government; when the relative performance is low and the performance is on the decrease, the listed companies with the setting of remuneration committee in the state-owned enterprises controlled by central government have higher executive compensation-performance sensitivity, which is on the contrary in the state-owned enterprises controlled by local government. This means the remuneration committee has different effects on executive compensation-performance sensitivity in different nature of property right, in the state-owned enterprises controlled by central government or by local government, in different relative performance and performance change. The remuneration committee established in the state-owned enterprises controlled by local government has empirical evidence to support the executives, which is in more conformity with the “Managers‘ Power Theory”. 