揭晓小.分析师覆盖、外部约束和收购方企业并购绩效[J].北京工商大学社科版,2015,30(4):58-69, 84 |
分析师覆盖、外部约束和收购方企业并购绩效 |
Analyst Coverage, External Constraints, and Acquiring Firm‘s Acquisition Performance |
投稿时间:2015-02-08 |
DOI: |
中文关键词: 分析师覆盖 并购绩效 信息中介 外部约束 |
英文关键词:analyst coverage M&A performance information intermediaries external constraints |
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重点项目“基于风险防范的地方性政府债务审计研究”(14AGL008)。 |
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中文摘要: |
区别于以往文献只研究分析师对市场绩效或对公司治理的影响,文章采用2SLS模型消除分析师覆盖的内生性,基于多角度的并购绩效来考察分析师覆盖效应。研究发现,分析师的影响有从经济绩效到市场绩效逐渐减小的趋势,表明分析师更注重公司基本面和成长性,而非短期市场表现。文章进一步验证了分析师的外部约束作用,具体体现为分析师覆盖的收购方企业经济绩效显著高于非覆盖企业,覆盖企业成长性也较高,表明分析师具有价值发现功能。 |
英文摘要: |
Unlike prior researches that only study analysts‘ impact on market performance or firm governance, this paper measures analyst coverage effects based on several aspects of M&A performance, and minimizes analyst coverage endogenous problem using two-stage least square method. It has been found in the paper that analysts‘ impact becomes weaker from economic performance to market performance, which implies that analysts care more about firms‘ fundamental aspects and their growth, rather than short market performance. Furthermore, this paper verifies analysts‘role in terms of external constraints, which can be reflected by the fact that the economic performancesof acquiring firms with analyst coverage is significantly higher than thoseof the company without analyst coverage. What‘s more, the covered firms also show higher growth rate, which shows that analysts play roles in discovering value. |
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