国有企业高管薪酬、企业分红与企业绩效关系研究

Research on Relationship among Executive Compensation, Corporate Dividends and Enterprise Performance

中文关键词:  国有企业  高管薪酬  企业分红  企业绩效  联立方程模型

英文关键词:state-owned enterprises (SOEs)  executive compensation  corporate dividends  enterprise performance  simultaneous equation model

中文摘要:

      文章基于国有企业产权改革的视角,选取2006—2013年我国国有企业上市公司的数据,建立联立方程模型,实证分析了高管薪酬、企业分红与企业绩效的关系,并将高管薪酬分为显性薪酬和隐性薪酬两个部分。研究结果显示,显性薪酬在一定程度上起到了激励高管提高企业价值的作用,显性薪酬对企业分红有较积极的影响。 同时,隐性薪酬也对企业分红产生积极影响。最后,在协调经理人与股东利益的基础上,对企业激励机制与约束机制的设计提出了相关政策建议。

英文摘要:

      From the perspective of property right reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs),this paper explores the interaction effects among executive compensation, corporate dividends and enterprise performance of SOEs, in which a simultaneous equation model is established by selecting the data of SOEs in the years from 2006 to 2013. Further, executive compensation is divided into dominant compensation and implicit compensation. The results show that the dominant compensation, to a certain extent, has the effect of the incentives to enhance corporate value, which also has a positive effect on corporate dividends. At the same time, the implicit compensation also have a positive effect on corporate dividends.Finally, by coordinating the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, it puts forward the scientific policy recommendation and implementation scheme to design SOEs‘ incentive mechanism and constraint mechanism.