另类股东控制、关联交易与掏空——海南航空与海航集团关联交易的案例研究

Alternative Shareholder Control, Connected Transaction and Tunneling:Case Study on Connected Transactions between Hainan Airlines and HNA Group

中文关键词:  股东控制  关联交易  掏空

英文关键词:shareholder control  connected transaction  tunneling

中文摘要:

      由于我国国有股东的特点,国有第一大股东的公司可能会出现另类股东控制。在另类股东控制下,公司主要代理问题是另类控股股东与控股股东和其他中小股东的利益冲突,另类控股股东可能会掏空上市公司。文章依据海南航空的股权结构、董事会成员和高管构成确定其为另类股东控制,并以海航集团与海南航空系列关联交易为案例,研究海航集团如何掏空海南航空。海航集团通过一系列高评估增值甚至超高评估增值的股权转让给海南航空,从海南航空套取资金或转移利益,导致海南航空为过多持有货币资金而大量负债、大量支付利息,降低了其盈利能力,甚至直接损害了其他股东利益。研究结果引发了对关联方掏空上市公司监管、投资者保障机制设置、资产评估监管和国有资产改革等政策方面的探讨。本研究理论上拓展了公司控制权理论、公司代理问题和掏空理论等的研究内容,实践上可以为我国上市公司监管实践和国资改革提供重要指导。

英文摘要:

      Due to the characteristics of China's state-owned shareholders, there may be alternative shareholder control in the state-owned companies as the largest shareholder. Under alternative shareholder control, the main agency problem is the interest conflicts among alternative shareholder, controlling shareholder and other small and medium-sized shareholders. The alternative shareholder may tunnel the listed company crazily. Hainan Airlines Co. Ltd. is classified as alternative shareholder control according to its ownership structure, board members and executive composition. This paper studies the connected transactions between HNA Group and Hainan Airlines to clarify how HNA Group has tunneled Hainan Airlines by a series of connected transactions. HNA Group obtains cash and gains profits from Hainan Airlines through a series of high value-added shares transferred to Hainan Airlines. Those connected transactions has made Hainan Airlines hold too much cash resulting in too many debts to pay a lot of interests, which reduces its profitability and even directly damages the interests of other shareholders. The research result provokes a probe into the supervision of tunnel in listed companies through connected transactions, investor protection mechanism, asset appraisal regulation, state-owned assets reform, etc. The research expands the theory research content of corporate control rights, agency problem and tunneling theory and provides important practical guidance for listing corporation regulatory and reform of state-owned assets. 