中国国企高管薪酬管制的原因及其对绩效的影响——基于委托人“不平等厌恶”模型

Reasons for Regulatory Remuneration of CEOs in China's SOEs and its Effect on Efficiency Based on Principal's Inequity-aversion Model

中文关键词:  官员型高管  薪酬管制  “不平等厌恶”偏好  政治激励

英文关键词:politically-connected CEO  regulatory remuneration  inequity-aversion preference  political incentive

中文摘要:

      国企高管薪酬管制是国企薪酬制度的重点,影响着企业高管的行为和企业绩效。文章通过构建一个含有委托人“不平等厌恶”偏好的多任务“委托—代理”模型,从政府“不平等厌恶”偏好角度考察了薪酬管制的原因及其对企业绩效的影响。研究发现,政府对国企初次分配的“不平等厌恶”偏好导致了薪酬管制,而政府干预下的政治激励和高管身份的不确定性是薪酬管制实施的关键；薪酬管制降低了企业绩效,且实证检验支持国有企业绩效的“薪酬管制论”。因此,摈弃对国企高管的行政选拔是提高企业效率、推进薪酬改革的关键。

英文摘要:

      Regulatory remuneration of CEOs is the key to remuneration system in the SOEs, which influences CEO's behaviors and corporation efficiency. A multi-task principal-agent model is built based on principal's “inequity-aversion” preference to examine the reasons for regulatory remuneration and its effect on corporation efficiency from a perspective of government's “inequity-aversion” preference. The research finds that the government's “inequity-aversion” preference during the initial distribution in the SOEs leads to regulatory remuneration, that the political incentive and the CEO identity uncertainty are the key to remuneration regulation, which further leads to under-performance. The empirical test speaks for “regulatory remuneration” in terms of efficiency in the SOEs. Therefore, the key to corporation efficiency and remuneration reform is to get rid of the government control over the CEO choice in the SOEs. 