基于供应链质量控制的“农超对接”零供关系演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Retailer-Supplier Relationship in “Linkage between Farmers and Supermarkets”Based on Supply Chain Quality Control

中文关键词:  质量控制  农超对接  零供关系  演化博弈

英文关键词:quality control  linkage between farmers and supermarkets  retailer-supplier relationship  evolutionary game theory

中文摘要:

      基于供应链质量控制的视角，以“农产品生产者＋超市”的模式为基础，运用演化博弈论的方法，构建“农超对接”模式中的零供关系演化博弈模型，动态地分析超市和农产品生产者之间策略选择的演变趋势。分析结果表明：超市选择“检查”策略的决定因素包括检查成本、对生产低质量农产品的生产者收取的罚款金等参数；农产品生产者选择“生产高质量农产品”策略的决定因素包括生产高质量农产品的成本、超市向其采购高质量农产品支付的批发价格等参数。最后，根据分析结果分别从超市和农产品生产者的角度给出了相应的提高农产品质量安全的措施和建议。

英文摘要:

      Based on the perspective of supply chain quality control and the model of “agricultural producers & supermarkets”, this paper builds an evolutionary game model between supermarket groups and agricultural producer groups with the method of evolutionary game theory. Then it applies the model to analyze the evolutionary tendency of strategy selection between supermarket groups and agricultural producer groups. The game analysis shows whether the supermarkets choose to check is related to the parameters such as check costs, fines charged from the producers who produce the low-quality agricultural products, etc. and whether the agricultural producers choose to produce the high-quality agricultural products is related to the parameters such as production costs and the wholesale price that supermarkets pay for the high-quality agricultural products, etc. Finally, according to the analysis result, corresponding measures and suggestion are put forward to improve the quality and the safety of agricultural products from the perspective of supermarkets and farmers respectively.