资产注入、大股东支持行为与公司绩效

Asset Injection, Controlling Shareholder’s Propping Behavior and Corporate Performance

中文关键词:  定向增发  资产注入  支持行为  公司绩效

英文关键词:directional private placement  asset injection  propping behavior  business performance

中文摘要:

      我国上市公司普遍存在第二类委托代理问题。以上市公司控股股东定向增发资产注入行为作为研究视角，研究了资本市场中大股东对上市公司“支持”抑或是“掏空”这一问题。研究发现，大股东注入的资产与我国证券市场中上市公司经营性资产具有比较高的关联度，有效地减少了大股东与上市公司之间的关联交易，完善了资产注入上市公司的价值链，提高了上市公司整体的经营绩效。

英文摘要:

      A secondary principal-agent problem is ubiquitous in China’s listing companies. To indicate whether the secondary agency conflicts are obviously improved or not after the split-share reform, this paper chooses the asset injection behavior via directional private placement by the controlling shareholders of listing companies as the research angle in order to study whether the major shareholders are “propping” or “tunneling” the listing companies on the capital market. The research finds that the assets injected by major shareholders are highly relevant to the business assets in listed companies, which effectively reduces the associate transactions between major shareholders and listed companies, improves the value chain of asset injection into listed companies and enhance the performance of listed companies as a whole.