搜索引擎竞价排名的经济机理及策略分析——兼论厂商广告竞争策略

An Analysis on Economic Mechanism and Strategy of Paid Placement in Search Engine:A Discussion on Competitive Strategy of Manufacturers’ Advertising

中文关键词:  竞价排名  网络欺诈  动态博弈  分离均衡  规制

英文关键词:paid placement  internet cheat  dynamic game  separating equilibrium  regulation

中文摘要:

      在异质产品假设下，以消费者效用和厂商利润最大化为基础，运用博弈论方法探讨搜索引擎竞价排名的经济机理及均衡策略。消费者对竞价排名的敏感度影响搜索效果和双方的期望收益，在不同广告形式之间存在竞争或替代关系。在网络欺诈环境下，动态博弈的信号传递和信念调整，使得产品定价反映真实产品质量，且消费者产生分离均衡的条件是高质量产品厂商定价足够高。长时期内各方利益的保障需要对竞价排名进行必要规制。

英文摘要:

      Under the hypothesis of heterogeneous goods, based on the maximization of consumers’ utility and manufactures’ profit and with the method of game theory, this article analyzes the economic mechanism of paid placement in search engine and the equilibrium strategy. Consumers’ sensitivity to paid placement influences the search results and the expected gains of consumers and manufactures, and there exists a competitive or substitutive relationship among different forms of advertising. In the environment of Internet cheat, signal transmission and faith adjustment in dynamic games make the pricing reflect the real quality of goods, and the conditions of separating equilibrium of consumers are that manufactures of high quality goods have high pricing. In the long run it is necessary to properly regulate paid placement to safeguard the interests of the parties concerned.