高严,彭韶兵.预算松弛:基于信息不对称理论的考察[J].北京工商大学社科版,2009,24(3):82-87 |
预算松弛:基于信息不对称理论的考察 |
Budgetary Slack:A Review Based on Information Asymmetry |
投稿时间:2009-02-19 |
DOI: |
中文关键词: 预算松弛 信息不对称 |
英文关键词:budgetary slack information asymmetry |
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(70862004) |
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中文摘要: |
以信息经济学理论能够解释预算松弛的产生动因及经济后果。预算管理“契约说”说明了预算松弛产生于预算管理中的信息不对称,并可以划分为预算制定(“签约”)中的“直接的预算松弛”和“间接的预算松弛”,即整个预算管理过程中存在着“编制松弛”和“执行松弛”等概念。预算松弛和信息不对称之间的相互影响会导致基于这种效应的逆向选择和道德风险等经济后果。 |
英文摘要: |
With the theory of information economics, the budgetary slack can be explained in its reasons and economic consequences. The "contract theory" on budgetary management indicates that budgetary slack results from information asymmetry in budgetary management, and can be divided into "direct budgetary slack" and "indirect budgetary slack" in budgeting ("signing the contract"), i.e. there are the notions of "establishing slack" and "executing slack" in the whole process of budgetary management. The mutual influence between budgetary slack and information asymmetry will lead to the economic consequences such as adverse selection and moral hazard based on such effect. |
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