李晓慧.中国名牌信用制度和施信行为——兼论“2004年中国名牌”的评选[J].北京工商大学社科版,2006,21(3):106-108
中国名牌信用制度和施信行为——兼论“2004年中国名牌”的评选
The Credit System of Chinese Name Brands and the Credit Grant Behavior --Concurrent Discussion on the Campaign of Chinese Name Brands through Public Appraisal
投稿时间:2006-01-10  
DOI:
中文关键词:  名牌  市场经济  信用制度  施信行为
英文关键词:name brand  market economy  credit system  credit grant behavior
基金项目:
作者单位
李晓慧 北京服装学院工商管理系,北京100029 
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中文摘要:
      市场经济实际上是构筑在信用基础上的交易经济,一国政府行为在信用体系建设中产生双重效应,即强化和弱化信用制度运行效果。2004年由国家质量监督检验检疫总局组织“中国名牌产品”评选活动,实际上是一种典型的不当施信行为,是与构建全社会信用体系的目标相违背的。本文就信用制度进行经济学解释,并对其产生和形成机制进行阐释。同时结合上述案例展开分析,从而为我国信用制度研究起到抛砖引玉的作用。
英文摘要:
      Market economy is essentially a kind of trading economy based on credit. In the construction of credit system, the governmental behavior in a nation can produce double effects, i.e. it can either strengthen or weaken the practical effects of credit system. The campaign of Chinese name brands through public appraisal organized in 2004 by General Administration of National Quality and Technology Supervision is actually a typical case of improper governmental behavior to grant credit, which is against the aim to construct a credit system in the society. This thesis gives an economic explanation to credit system and its forming system. Meanwhile, with the above-mentioned case, it makes an extended analysis in order to promote the study on credit system so that more valuable research will follow.
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